Means of Effective Security Sector Reform: A Comparison of US Military and Contractor Programs

**A Monograph
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   With continuing emphasis on building partner capacity to deal with internal and external security threats, the United States (US) Department of State and Department of Defense continue to increase partner nation security force capacity within Security Sector Reform (SSR). This monograph assesses whether US SSR programs, in concert with other contributor nations, fulfill US foreign policy better when implemented by US government agencies rather than by contractors. The intervening variables of transparency, effective oversight, and contractor misconduct were identified to help illustrate examples where policy outcomes are predictable based on the given method of SSR support. Several case studies test the theory and link the independent and dependent variables. Within six selected case studies, the analysis shows how the intervening variables of transparency, effective oversight, and contractor misconduct effect the outcome of the SSR effort. These case studies provide a qualitative comparison to test the theory by reviewing SSR performed by predominantly contracted, mixed, and predominantly military sources. Examining the case studies with the three variables identified within the literature review resulted in an unclear connection between a specific policy and the overall outcome. US policy aims for SSR programs may result in unintended consequences, regardless of the type of support and overall unity of effort of the SSR program..

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Abstract

MEANS OF EFFECTIVE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: A COMPARISON OF US MILITARY AND CONTRACTOR PROGRAMS by MAJ David S Diaz, US ARMY, 44 pages.

With continuing emphasis on building partner capacity to deal with internal and external security threats, the United States (US) Department of State and Department of Defense continue to increase partner nation security force capacity within Security Sector Reform (SSR). This monograph assesses whether US SSR programs, in concert with other contributor nations, fulfill US foreign policy better when implemented by US government agencies rather than by contractors. The intervening variables of transparency, effective oversight, and contractor misconduct were identified to help illustrate examples where policy outcomes are predictable based on the given method of SSR support. Several case studies test the theory and link the independent and dependent variables. Within six selected case studies, the analysis shows how the intervening variables of transparency, effective oversight, and contractor misconduct effect the outcome of the SSR effort. These case studies provide a qualitative comparison to test the theory by reviewing SSR performed by predominantly contracted, mixed, and predominantly military sources.

The case studies include six countries with various types of support as well as policy intents. An examination of support to Ukraine in 2009, Georgia in 2008, and Senegal in 2009 provide examples of SSR programs utilizing a mix of contracted and US government support. A second examination of support to Croatia in 1995, Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2009 and South Sudan in 2009 provide examples of predominantly contracted support to the SSR programs. Examining the case studies with the three variables identified within the literature review resulted in an unclear connection between a specific policy and the overall outcome. US policy aims for SSR programs may result in unintended consequences, regardless of the type of support and overall unity of effort of the SSR program.

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Introduction

The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) specifically states that "sustained efforts to strengthen the capability of security forces" are important to achieve long-term global security.[1] The security of US interests abroad comes as a byproduct of the security capability within partner states, which is enhanced through training and engagements. Security Sector Reform (SSR) serves as the method by which the US helps partner nations to build the capability to provide safety, security, and justice. Enhancing partner capacity through SSR ensures the potential for stability and advances US interests in the global environment.

This monograph assesses whether US SSR programs, in concert with other contributor nations, fulfill US foreign policy better when implemented by US government agencies rather than by contractors. Application of SSR by the US government agencies to increase partner nation capability, rather than contracted SSR, should achieve the overall intent of US foreign policy with the equivalent effectiveness in training.

To enhance the security capability of partner nations, the US applies SSR through the application of both military, as well as contracted trainers, using programs such as Foreign Military Financing (FMF). These programs not only create the conditions for increased defense modernization, but also align partners with doctrine compatible with US doctrine, such as NATO doctrine, to facilitate integration of partner security forces. Currently, the US Department of State (DOS) is the predominant developer and contractor of SSR programs. With Operation New Dawn in Iraq scheduled to end in 2011 and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan to end in 2014, the available pool of trainers should increase the number of opportunities for US military to

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[1] U.S. National Security Council, "National Security Strategy," (Washington, DC: 2010), 27.

assume a larger role in SSR programs.[2] With this change in utilization of forces, DOS in conjunction with US Department of Defense (DOD) can exploit the available pool of US military in SSR programs.

The literature review in this monograph identifies the purpose of SSR in US policy. Additionally, the review examines the cost of contracted SSR. However, it does not clearly depict an apparent cost benefit of US military SSR programs when compared with contracted SSR programs. The monograph does, on the other hand, use six case studies in both Eurasia and Africa to illustrate how the SSR conducted by government agencies, rather than contractors alone, results in more positive and consistent policy outcomes. This illustration provides evidence that SSR conducted by US government agencies is a more effective use of US resources.

Definitions of Terms

The following is a glossary of terms used throughout this monograph. US national sources were used when references disagreed over definitions.

Security Sector Reform (SSR). "Is the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice."[3] This includes partner nation institutions, processes and forces under the control of their government.[4] DOD supports efforts focused on armed forces and the defense sector across the operational spectrum.[5]

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[2] Kate Brannen, "Combat brigades in Iraq under different name," *Army Times.* August 19, 2010. http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/08/dn-brigades-stay-under-different-name-081910/ (accessed January 15, 2011)

[3] United States Agency for International Development, "Security Sector Reform," *USAID Government Web Site..* February 2009, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance /publications/pdfs/SSR_JS_Mar2009.pdf (accessed January 20, 2011), 3.

[4] Ibid., 2.

[5] Ibid., 5.

Private Military Companies (PMCs). Non-state actors hired by governments or

nongovernmental organizations to support SSR programs. These organizations do not execute

their contracts under the same laws as militaries or UN Member State contributions.[6]

Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ). A contract type used by the US

government in SSR for streamlining contracts and speeding up delivery for SSR contracts which

have an indefinite quantity of services above a minimum specified in the contract. These

contracts usually specify service with a minimum and maximum total dollar amount of the

contract with options for extending the contract. The contracts issued in 2009 under the

AFRICAP Recompete supporting SSR programs in Africa are Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite

Quantity contracts.[7]

Security Cooperation (SC). "All Department of Defense interactions with foreign

defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests,

develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and

provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation."[8] The AFRICAP

program supports US security interests and builds capacity within partner nations supporting

DOD and DOS strategic interests.

Security Assistance (SA). Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act

of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related

statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-

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[6] Sarah Meharg and Aleisha Arnusch, *PKSOI Papers: Security Sector Reform: Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building,* ed. Susan Merrill (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January, 2010), 11.

[7] U.S. General Services Administration, *Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ),* January 17, 2011, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/103926 (accessed January 29, 2011); Katrina Mason, "Delaying Peacekeeping: AFRICAP," *Journal of International Peace Operations* 5, no. 3 (November-December 2009), 24.

[8] U.S. Department of Defense, *JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January, 2011), 325.

related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency."[9] The AFRICAP program falls under the category of Security Assistance.

Foreign Internal Defense (FID). "Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security."[10]

Military Capability. "The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability."[11]

Limitations of Scope

This monograph research and analysis examines only contracted and military SSR as it applies to increasing partner nation's military. It does not consider the other components of security forces to include local and boarder police. Additionally, this monograph does not examine SSR's contribution to judicial and corrections restructuring. Research conducted for this monograph is limited to open source information, and therefore does not completely address all interviews and reports available on the subject.

Theory and Literature Review

A considerable amount of information concerning SSR and the use of private security contractors to achieve US policy exists. The following three sections address the national

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[9] Ibid., 325.

[10] Ibid.,145.

[11] Ibid., 233.

strategic basis for SSR, which includes published US doctrine, policy literature, academic study, and discusses the problems of implementing SSR.

National Strategic Documents

Three primary documents address the use of SSR to achieve US national security goals.[12] The first of these documents is the 2010 *National Security Strategy* (NSS), which addresses the need for mutual global security between the United States and its partner nations.[13] Through US leadership, the NSS emphasizes the need for promoting security through stronger international cooperation to address global challenges. The NSS describes both the need to bolster the capacity of partner nations to address internal and external threats that directly or indirectly threaten American citizens.[14] Finally, the NSS addresses the need for fiscal responsibility within a national system that requires increased transparency.[15]

The 2007 US DOS *Strategic Plan* also discusses the importance of SSR in achieving the nation's strategic objectives. It addresses the need for security to counter the terrorist threat, and the need for increased partner nation capacity to achieve a greater level of security.[16] The *Strategic Plan* emphasizes the necessity for unity of effort within the employment of SSR programs.

The 2010 *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (QDDR) supports the guidance contained in the 2007 Strategic Plan and is the most current document that specifies a national

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[12] This monograph uses the US DOS strategic documents as a justification for both DOS and DOD title 22 funded SSR programs. For further information on how DOD develops a Ground Component Commander (GCC) theater campaign plans and security cooperation program, see the series of parallel DOD supporting documents starting with the NSS, then National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Guidance for Employment of Forces (GEF), and then a GCC's theater campaign plan which encompasses a security cooperation plan.

[13] U.S. National Security Council, "National Security Strategy," 1.

[14] Ibid., 26.

[15] Ibid., 34-35.

[16] U.S. Department of State, *Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012,* (Washington, D.C., May 7, 2007), 12.

strategy. It emphasizes the need for US DOS and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to improve the US ability to address crises and conflicts associated with failing and failed states.[17] To increase US ability to mitigate crises, the plan highlights the need to work with partner nations and draws attention to the requirement for preventive diplomacy focused on peacekeeping reform as one of the highest priorities. The QDDR addresses the necessity for transparency within operations as well as the need for unity of effort.[18] Finally, the QDDR addresses the prerequisite for transparent accountable contracting supporting programs that assist in rebuilding security sectors as a means to establish long term peace.[19]

The US DOS published the first QDDR in order to address the stability of nations that are weak, instable, or suffering from disaster.[20] The QDDR specifically underscores the need for SSR to build a comprehensive and sustained long-term solution for peace under the rule of law.[21] These solutions aim to develop an effective, sustainable, and accountable military for the host nation that supports security.[22] The US DOS utilizes the QDDR to facilitate the visualization of SSR programs and to synchronize the whole of government approach through quarterly assessments and joint DOS and DOD meetings. Both agencies attend these meetings to facilitate unity of effort, clarify the individual agency roles and responsibilities, and to avoid duplicating efforts.[23] This synchronization process indicates that the US DOS recognizes the need for a whole of government approach with a common framework for SSR. Additionally, US DOS acknowledges

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[17] U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,* (Washington, DC, December 2010), 121.

[18] Ibid., 155.

[19] Ibid., 152, 177.

[20] Ibid., 121.

[21] Ibid., 152.

[22] Ibid., 153.

[23] Ibid., 155.

a need within the QDDR to re-evaluate contracting management in order to achieve mission goals.

Within the context of the US DOS mission, the QDDR addresses the need for better contracting practices when weighed against the risk and benefits of private contracting.[24] To achieve integrity of contracting practices, US DOS distinguishes between the need to improve the oversight and accountability of the SSR contractors and the encouraging of initiative and creativity allegedly associated with private contractors.[25] This includes the need for an increased number of oversight personnel to manage existing contracts.[26] Without effective oversight and accountability, the potential for waste, fraud, and abuse increases. This risk supports the improvement of the way both DOS and DOD accomplish SSR oversight for direct contracted SSR programs. Additionally, the QDDR recommends conducting a "cost and efficiency analysis" to identify whether contractors or government agencies should perform the required work.[27] To date, the US DOS has not made public any of these analyses. As federal agencies look to decrease operations costs, both DOS and DOD are compelled to identify ways to reduce the overall cost while retaining capacity for contingency type missions. Analysis, in many cases, reveals that contracting versus government agency execution of SSR tasks by the DOS, as well as the DOD, reduce overhead and ensure that programs maximize SSR value.

Federal Agency, Joint, and Army Doctrine

Under federal agency publications, one foundational document that applies to SSR accomplishment is the *Security Sector Reform* handbook, published in 2009. This document describes the DOS and the USAID understanding of roles, responsibilities, guiding principles,

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[24] Ibid., 177.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid., 180.

[27] Ibid., 178.

and method of SSR implementation within the DOS plan. It emphasizes the critical role that the DOS has when partnering with the DOD, who fulfills a supporting role in SSR.[28] The SSR manual also identifies the need for unity of effort within planning and execution, effective oversight through monitoring, evaluation, and the need for transparency for the population, host nation leaders, and other relevant actors.[29]

The USAID handbook for SSR is another document that provides a whole of government approach to addressing SSR. President George W. Bush's National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD) – 1 and (NSPD) – 44 direct that the DOS serves as the lead agency for US interagency policy initiatives and program support for SSR. In a support capacity, the DOD supplies the specific needs of the host nation's armed forces throughout the operational spectrum. USAID supports SSR through its focus on governance and rule of law programs to build civilian capacity and to provide security and justice.[30] With the current requirement for SSR programs and the demand on the DOD for combat forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DOS has turned to PMCs in order to meet demands, while the DOD prepares to implement a feasible, acceptable, and suitable alternative.

Under joint doctrine there are two noteworthy documents that apply to SSR. The first is Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, dated October 5, 2009. While this publication addresses SSR within the context of supporting counterinsurgency operations, it also supports the joint nature of SSR and the need for unity of action within the context of a whole of government approach.[31] With few exceptions, JP 3-24 emphasizes the same characteristics of

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[28] United States Agency for International Development, "Security Sector Reform," 5.

[29] Ibid., 11-13.

[30] Ibid., 3.

[31] U.S. Department of Defense, *JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations*, VI-16.

implementation and guiding principles described in the DOS SSR manual.[32] Again, this emphasis communicates the need for transparency within the context of SSR programs.

JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, serves as the DOD doctrine to address SSR operations and the aspects to consider when developing and implementing these actions. This doctrine re-enforces the implementation principles expressed in USAID SSR handbook. Additionally, it re-enforces the subordination of DOD in SSR programs and the necessity for the relevant actors in SSR to integrate their approaches with unified action.[33] This doctrine reflects the guiding principles expressed in the USAID SSR handbook, to include connecting security and justice with fostering transparency.[34] Lastly, this joint publication re-enforces the requirement for US security assistance in support of SSR, which must consider the legal and legislative obligations placed on US agencies.[35] JP 3-24 fails to connect SSR action with US Army doctrine and does not demonstrate how army operations support SSR programs.

The second joint publication is JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* (FID), dated July 12, 2010. This publication briefly identifies SSR's relationship to FID operations as enabling partner nations to improve how they provide security within the rule of law.[36] It defines security force assistance (SFA) as military operations to organize, train, equip, rebuild, build, advise, and assist host nation military forces. Overall, FID serves as the operative mechanism that supports internal security within the framework of SFA.[37]

Army doctrine uses two main publications, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07 and 3-07.1, to describe the composition and method of execution for SSR from the Army's perspective. FM 3-07,

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[32] Ibid., VI-16-17.

[33] Ibid., VI-16.

[34] Ibid., VI-16-17.

[35] Ibid., VI-18.

[36] U.S. Department of Defense, *JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July, 2010), VI-30.

[37] Ibid., VI-31.

Stability Operations, which is the foundational doctrine for stability operations, articulates and re-enforces the principles outlined within the US DOS handbook on SSR. FM 3-07 emphasizes the need for transparency within the SSR program while fostering appropriate accountability and legitimacy within military force.[38] This FM expands the concepts of the US DOS SSR handbook by addressing SSR as a comprehensive program emphasizing the need for appropriate military force development in unique host nation circumstances.[39] FM 3-07 introduces SFA and its role in developing security forces; it also addresses the necessary characteristics for trainers. Further, it writes to the need for adaptive trainers operating in a transparent, collaborative, and contiguous way. [40] This document effectively points out how the US Army links national strategic objectives to SSR programs that are executed by US Army or contracted SFA assets.

FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, serves as the US Army's primary source for SSR implementation. This document, like JP 3-24, encompasses the same principles as the USAID handbook, but expands the definitions as well as the understanding framework of SSR and planning considerations. Within the context of DOD theater security cooperation plans, the US Army conducts security assistance (SA) programs to assist in increasing the capability, capacity, and sustainability of security forces in support of the legitimate authority.[41] Nesting this plan with the overall DOS SSR plan facilitates unity of effort within a shared vision.[42]

To better develop a plan of support for DODs contribution to SSR, FM 3-07 expresses the need to address several factors that influence reform. In considering SSR programs, FM 3-07 expresses the need to address cultural awareness, leadership capacity building, public trust and confidence,

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[38] U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-07, Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October, 2008), 6-7.

[39] Ibid., 6-10 – 6-13.

[40] Ibid., 6-14 – 6-15.

[41] Ibid., 6-14.

[42] Ibid., 6-6.

host-nation dependency, perseverance, and end state when developing SSR programs.[43] These planning considerations facilitate understanding of the environment and allow the planners to develop security cooperation plans that are time phased to complement other governmental and non-governmental agencies. The potential exists for these agencies, as well as their future plans, to become de-synchronized if they are not constantly assessed and re-aligned as the environment changes. Contractors and military involved in these programs must have the ability and competency to report status that limits personal bias. Unanticipated consequences may result from de-synchronized operations, and can create the potential for harm to the host nation militaries, which is in contradiction to the principles of SSR.[44]

FM 3-07 re-enforces the principles of SSR given in the previously mentioned USAID handbook and expands the definitions. The second principle, which incorporates the standard of good governance and respect for human rights, emphasizes the responsibility for the trainers to help create a force that is accountable, transparent, led by civilians, and legitimate in the eyes of the population.[45] This reflects the same democratic principles the US citizens expect from US military and contracted support used to implement SSR programs. In the absence of these principles, the SSR effort potentially lacks credibility leading away from the desired end state of US policy.

FM 3-07 and the USAID handbook emphasize the need for conducting SSR programs as transparently as possible.[46] This use of information within the context of the element of national power serves as an effective way for fostering legitimacy among host-nation officials, citizens, and other relevant actors. In the absence of transparency, SSR programs potentially increase

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[43] Ibid., 6-8.

[44] Ibid., 6-6.

[45] Ibid., 6-7.

[46] Ibid.; United States Agency for International Development, "Security Sector Reform," 11.

tension among the relevant actors due to misunderstandings in the absence of clear information on SSR programs. This may lead to unintended consequences that violate the sixth principle of SSR, which is do no harm. Three other principles that support host-nation ownership include balance operational support with institutional reform, link security and justice, and foster transparency. Therefore, SSR programs should maximize transparency during the execution of the programs.

FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*, serves as the primary Army doctrine for how to employ Army forces in support of improving the capability and capacity of security forces within the control of partner nations. This document defines the relationship between security cooperation (SC), security assistance (SA), and foreign internal defense (FID) and how these activities increase the capacity of host nation security forces.[47] FM 3-07.1 describes the scope and limitations of SFA training based on strategic objectives. This doctrine justifies the basic principles of transparency and accountability in supporting various security situations based on the strategic objectives.

Academic and Policy Literature

Current literature identifies a number of issues that persist in the employment of SSR programs. These issues represent the inconsistency of internationally executed methods for the employment of SSR. Additionally, the complex nature of the environment within SSR programs exasperates the execution of these programs. The following articles reflect current observations of issues within the literature and serve as the basis for identifying applicable intervening variables for analysis in evaluating the relative merits of SSR conducted by government agencies or contractors.

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[47] U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May, 2009), 1-7.

Madeline England, a research analyst with the Future of Peace Operations program at the Stimson Center, identifies the first issue as unity of effort of international contributors to SSR programs. She argues that current practice by multiple actors led to inconsistent priorities in implementing SSR programs. Because multiple contributors possess varied priorities, "coordination and coherence" as well as the inconsistency of application for best practices results in inconsistent SSR programs.[48] Unfortunately, multiple donor environments create the best opportunity for success from the stand-point of resources, but the inconsistent unity of effort leads to a multitude of unsustainable labor.[49]

The concern of partner and contributor nation oversight is a second issue identified in current literature. With the principles of "democratic and civilian control, transparency, accountability, human rights, and compliance with international law" as cornerstones to building partner nation security capacity, current SSR programs must emphasize these elements to ensure success.[50] Considering these elements allows the donor country to help the partner nation develop legitimate systems for fair and ethical oversight of security forces. Contributor nations leverage contractors when conditions allow facilitating short-term needs. However, in employing these contractors, though, the partner nation must develop regulations to strengthen the accountability of these organizations.[51]

The next issue of transparency represents a significant issue to ensure SSR program long-term effectiveness. The host nation must identify civil concerns to ensure a common understanding of

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[48] Madeline England, "Security Sector Reform in Stabilization Environments: A Note on Current Practice," In *Security Sector Reform: Thematic Literatue Review on Best Practices and Lessons Learned*, by Madeline England, & Alix Boucher, 9-38,(Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, December, 2009), 7.

[49] Jeffrey Isima, "Scaling the Hurdle or Muddling Through Coordination and Sequencing Implemntation of Security Sector Reform in Africa," In The Future of Security Sector Reform, edited by Mark Sedra, 327-338,(Ontario: The Centre For International Governance Innovation, 2010), 333-334); Ibid., 21.

[50] Ibid., 89.

[51] Ibid., 87.

SSR efforts by the government as well as the society. [52] By ensuring common understanding, the partner nation supports the guiding principle in SSR of transparency. Additionally, the contributor nations must clearly articulate their purpose and ends to ensure they do not create the conditions for resistance to reforms. The partner nation's communications with its population facilitates attaining defense and other government objectives.[53] By creating transparent SSR programs, both contributing nations and partner nations facilitate increased security capacity while legitimizing the government.

Current literature identifies a fourth issue of improving mid-level management. Within a partner nation's security sector, management must function throughout the organizations to ensure the effective administration of security forces. Unfortunately, in practice many SSR programs focus on the lowest skill levels and fail to develop the management procedures needed to synchronize and oversee the capacity developed at the lowest level.[54] Ignoring this key factor means of employing security forces drives partner nations to create conditions for ineffective security forces that may use their new capability for inappropriate activities. As discussed in the Republic of Croatia case study, the forces that received the training then employed their army against Serbian militaries.

The last issue in much of the current literature involves several considerations in developing SSR programs. The practice of extensive recruiting and vetting by DynCorp in Liberia demonstrated a necessary process to build the correct security force in failed and failing state.[55] DynCorp

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[52] Ibid., 89.

[53] Ibid., 114.

[54] Alex Martin and Peter Wilson, "The Role of the Private Sector in Security Sector Reform," In The Future of Security Sector Reform, edited by Mark Sedra, 314-326, (Ontario: The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010), 318.; England, "Security Sector Reform in Stabilization Environments: A Note on Current Practice," 105.

[55] Alix Boucher, "Defense Sector Reform: A Note on Current Practice," In *Security Sector Reform: Thematic Literatue Review on Best Practices and Lessons Learned*, by Madeline England, & Alix Boucher, 119-143, (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, December, 2009), 143.

identified a need to assist the host nation in recruiting competent capable trainees and the

requirement to assist in reviewing the potential trainee's backgrounds. In identifying this

requirement, DynCorp developed a means of creating a core of trainees with potential to learn,

retain, and justly employ the material taught to them. This practice requires an investment of

significant time and expense, but given suitable circumstances, it increases capacity. Another best

practice involves using pre-established doctrine to facilitate the unit training of a contributor

nation in order to increase capacity, which allows the SSR program to increase its capacity but at

a higher cost than individual training. Additionally, this practice may require a greater need for

embedded advisors to facilitate the overall cost for training, which increases the cost requirements

to contributor nations.[56] Lastly, SSR programs must prevent corruption within the partner nation

government to preserve the ability to increase both partner nation legitimacy in the eyes of the

population and to ensure the appropriate use of security forces.[57]

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) addresses the

relative advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing SSR in a handbook entitled *OECD DAC*

Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. This handbook discusses

the relative advantage of using governmental agencies from international donors to support SSR

programs. Specifically, governmental agencies assist in establishing positive relationships while

providing legitimacy associated with the donor.[58] One concern with using contractors for SSR is

the risk for "democratic deficit," which represents the lack of governmental oversight associated

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[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] OECD, "OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice," *Home: Conflict and Fragility > OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* , February 25, 2007, http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_45884768_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed April 25, 2011), 239.

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with contractors.[59] Furthermore, OECD, much like many other studies, identifies friction in unity of effort that is exasperated by the nature of contracted assistance.[60] These important ideas and general principles support the possible advantages of using governmental agencies to fulfill SSR.

The document that provides historical perspective of SSR is the US DOS "AFRICAP Recompete Solicitation SAQMMA08R023" dated June 27, 2008. This document provides a perspective for contracted SSR that supports the enhancement of African stability.[61] A solicitation, in conjunction with the individual Task Order Request for Proposal (TORP), provides a framework for supporting peace keeping operations through assistance, and includes military training and advising in both Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).[62] Through an examination of the individual requirements within the TORPs and an understanding of the type of contract and its intent, an appreciation for the cost and transparency of these contracted SSR programs is found.

The testimony provided on February 28, 2011 to the US Commission on Wartime Contracting serves as the second historical record. In this testimony, several concerned parties to include Rear Admiral Robert J. Gilbeau, Commander of Defense Contract Management International (DCMI), and a civilian representative, Scott Amey, general counsel for a project on government oversight, testified concerning the need and capacity for documenting contractor misconduct.[63] Since 2002, over 1,000 incidents of civil, criminal and administrative contractor

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[59] Ibid., 240.

[60] Ibid.

[61] U.S. Department of State, *AFRICAP Recompete,* September 11, 2009. https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=8c9852ce91f1fe6c3e79273f0b04e500&tab=core&tabmode=list&= (accessed January 29, 2011), 5.

[62] Ibid., 4.

[63] Commission on Wartime Contracting, *Ensuring Contractor Accountability: Past Performance and Suspension & Debartment,* Testimony, (Washington, D.C.: Commission on Wartime Contracting, 28 February, 2011), 2.

misconduct occurred among 150 US federal contractors.[64] These incidents included individual criminal activity that occurred during the performance of normal duties, as well as other incidents of contractors who purposefully defrauded the government. As a result, the US Army took over 400 suspension/debarment actions in fiscal year 2010.[65] Although these cases do not solely include SSR related contracts, they demonstrate the current concern for both effective oversight and transparency with regards to contracting for the purpose of accountability.

GAO report 11-419T, *Foreign Operations: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight*, serves as the third historical record supporting the need for addressing contractor relations with the federal government. Within the report, Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers, Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade for the US GAO, identified the oversight of contracts by USAID and DOS as at times inadequate.[66] Additionally, she identified the need for greater scrutiny of contracts to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.[67] Compounded further, Ms. Williams-Bridges identified the need for expanded capacity by US Agencies to conduct strategic planning and performance measurement efforts in support of foreign policy.[68] This historical record also demonstrates the need for system to ensure contractor accountability.

Gaps in the Record

There are doctrinal and historical gaps within SSR literature. Overall, the doctrine clearly articulates the roles and responsibilities from an interagency perspective, but fails to clearly

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[64] Ibid., 8.

[65] Commission on Wartime Contracting, *Ensuring Contractor Accountability: Past Performance and Suspension & Debartment,* Testimony, 75.

[66] U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Foreign Operations: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,* Testimony Before the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Accountability Office, 2011), 6.

[67] Ibid., 8.

[68] Ibid., 11.

address the roles and applicability of incorporating contractors into either DOS or DOD concepts for SSR programs. Although this leaves flexibility in determining the appropriate use of contractors in SSR programs, it contradicts the principles of foster transparency and do no harm identified by DOS and DOD.

Gaps in the historical record exist as well. The specific contract task orders and actual expenditures for contracted SSR programs are not readily available. Additionally, contractors consider specific plan and methods for contracted SSR proprietary information and thus prevent any examination of these critical components for analysis. The DOS also considers the African Bureau Strategic Plan and the specific mission strategic resource plans sensitive and thus do not make them available as well. This creates an additional gap, which prevents an accurate historical understanding of contracted SSR programs, their intent, and the expected outcomes as they relate to the intended policy.

Trends

Policy outcomes result from US doctrinal SSR programs, and an examination of several intervening variables facilitates the understanding of the current application of these programs. First, the general lack of transparency in contracted SSR support leads to the potential for reduced SSR effectiveness, which then weakens the host nation security capacity. The diminished security capacity creates the potential for poor unity of effort within US and NGO programs, which could potentially increase the tensions between the host nation governments and their population. Second, historical examples of less than effective oversight led to the potential for reduced SSR effectiveness in building capacity. Last, past patterns of contractor misconduct created a potential for tension between contractors and US desired ends. Each of these three variables led to the increased possibility of reduced overall policy outcome resulting from contracted SSR support.

Three questions guide further analysis. The first question focuses on what type of support is provided by the United States given a particular policy, and serves to compare the policy intent

of the US government with the type of support used to fulfill this policy. Within the context of US foreign policy, this illustrates the connection between the ends and means, acknowledging that there may be slight variances in the way contractors and government agencies implement a program.

The second question considers at what level the unities of effort among US and international contributors support US policy. Using contractors for SSR, both the DOS and DOD can leverage the creative and adaptive nature of the private sector to develop plans that are unique and effective. This flexibility, coupled with the varying policy intents of partner nations, can create potential conflict between the contributors and the host nation. In understanding the US policy for SSR programs and the intent of other international contributors, the US can determine the potential for program success.

The third question examines the cost to implement SSR programs given a specific country and type of program support. This question looks to compare and contrast the actual cost of contracted programs with the type of support provided and the given policy intent for SSR programs. Within the context of US National Expenditures, this question quantifies the best use of Title 22 funding in support of SSR.

Methodology

The identification of the intervening variables of transparency, effective oversight, and contractor misconduct in the previous section provides examples in which policy outcomes are consistent based on the given method of SSR support. Considering these intervening variables within the context of a series of case studies allows this monograph to test the theory and link the independent and dependent variables. Using a controlled comparison case study, as described by Stephen Van Evera, a professor in the MIT Political Science Department, this monograph

performs a qualitative comparison of the intervening variables that results in validation of the theory.[69]

Within the selected case studies, the intervening variables of transparency and effective oversight should illustrate how observers bind higher values to lower values with respect to contractor misconduct in each of the case studies. To correctly test the theory, case studies in this monograph review predominantly contracted, mixed, and predominantly military SSR. This structure requires the selection of a series of case studies to provide qualitative comparison and that take in to account the varied nature of SSR support. The case studies provide examples to allow for identification of the independent, intervening, and dependent variables.

Research Methodology

It is necessary to examine the foundation of SSR in current US doctrine and its applicability to building capability in partner nations. Further, an examination of how this doctrine necessitated the use of trainers and contractors in support of government efforts and recent SSR operations improves understanding of the impact of this practice. A review of the gaps in available information on current SSR programs identifies shortcomings of the contracting programs. Finally, the three variables of transparency, effective oversight, and contractor misconduct were identified with regard to contracted SSR programs.

Several case studies illustrate instances in which contracted SSR operations increased capability in support of US foreign policy. The case studies include six countries with various types of support and policy intents. An examination of support to Ukraine in 2009, Georgia in 2008, and Senegal in 2009 provide examples of SSR programs that utilized a mix of contracted and US government support. A second examination of support to Croatia in 1995, Democratic

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[69] Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 56-58.

Republic of the Congo in 2009, and South Sudan in 2009 provides examples of predominantly contracted support to the SSR programs within these countries. The cases selected provide examples of purely contracted, purely government agency supported, and mixed contracted and government agency supported. As the methodology unfolds, the monograph finds that most SSR programs contain elements of both government agency and contracted support. These six case studies provide examples with a preponderance of contracted support or a mix of contractors and US government agency support; however, the examples are not purely one or the other, as was original asserted.

The sources for the case studies came from publicly available primary and secondary source material, as well as contract information published within the solicitation for contracts conducted by the DOS. To validate the stated theory of this monograph, the case studies should demonstrate increased transparency and oversight in the mixed case studies when compared to contracted case studies. Additionally, the case studies should demonstrate decreased levels of contractor misconduct when compared due to the increased oversight. To prove the theory false, the case studies should demonstrate a decrease in transparency and oversight in the cases with an increase in contractor misconduct. Additionally, no consistency between the case studies would also prove the theory false.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Methodology

The strengths of this methodology lie in establishing a contemporary doctrinal foundation of SSR concepts. The methodology provides links to policy implementation effectiveness in six historical examples. The effectiveness is both qualitative and quantitative in nature, and justifies the conclusions identified.

The weakness of this methodology lies in the complexity of the application of SSR programs. By analyzing only the contributions of contracted SSR in a particular example, the conclusions fail to account for varied inputs into a complex system resulting in a slightly more

biased perspective. The analysis does not take into account the perspective of the host nation population and their exposure and opinion of the SSR efforts.

Analysis and Synthesis

The following six case studies provide examples of US support to SSR programs. The first two case studies, Ukraine in 2009 and Georgia in 2008, provide examples of increased SSR capacity through mixed means in these two former Soviet States. The next case, Croatia in 1995, provides an example of effective contracted SSR in a former Yugoslavian state. South Sudan in 2009 provides an additional case study looking at predominantly contracted SSR. The last two cases, Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2009 and Senegal in 2009, represent SSR programs on the African continent that support national and regional security concerns using predominantly mixed contracted and government agency support. Table 1 provides a summary of all the case studies, as well as a synopsis of the research questions and variables of each case study.

Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Ukraine

As a former Soviet province, Ukraine serves as an example of a relatively stable state that is capable of maintaining its internal security and able to integrate and assist in PKO operations abroad. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine military established an organization based on Soviet doctrine and capabilities. Over the following 17 years, the Ukraine military transitioned toward a NATO compatible force led by civilian leadership.[70] Although the Ukraine no longer desires acceptance into NATO, it still demonstrates a desire for economic integration with Europe and to maintain positive relations with Russia.[71]

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[70] IHS Jane's: Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russia and the CIS: Armed Forces, Ukraine,* November 19, 2010, http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/CISS_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Ukraine&Prod_Name=CISS &K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/cissu/ukras100.htm@current (accessed March 17, 2011).

[71] Ibid.; U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009 vol. I," Joint Report to Congress, (Washington, DC, 2009), 152-153.

Although historically the US government encouraged the Ukraine towards NATO membership, the current foreign policy for Ukraine focuses on creating a strategic partnership and an independent democratic Ukraine with a market economy. In developing military capacity, US policy emphasizes increasing Ukraine's ability to support NATO missions and activities,[72] which includes a focus on military legal training, civil-military relations, and officer and NCO development.[73] The increased capacity, in part, resulted in Ukraine's commitment of 29,000 forces in support of NATO Joint Rapid Reaction Force.[74] This is notable because an increased capacity within the Ukrainian Army supports internal security requirements and PKO contingency requirements for the near future.

NATO serves as the major international body that influences SSR in Ukraine. Specifically, the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR) is the major body that directs the SSR programs with regard to civilian-military relations, democratic oversight, management of armed forces, and national security concepts.[75] In conjunction with NATO partner nations, JWGDR sets and assesses SSR progress.[76] The US policy harmonizes with the direction of the JWGDR SSR, allowing for effective unity of effort of SSR programs.

In 2009, the US government spent $3,838,364 to support SSR programs in the Ukraine. These programs included International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). These programs support the goals established by the Ukrainian government and use a mix of US government agencies,

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[72] U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009 vol. I," Joint Report to Congress (Washington, DC, 2009), 153.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

[75] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform,* October 27, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-4403CB32-C2317042/natolive/topics_50320.htm (accessed March 19, 2011).

[76] IHS Jane's: Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russia and the CIS: Armed Forces, Ukraine*.

internationally contributed programs, and defense modernization contractors to achieve these ends.[77] These efforts support a broad range of programs resulting in a regional strategic partner that supports peace and stability in Eastern Europe.

In transitioning to an independent state in 1992-1993, Ukraine began to move away from the control of the former Soviet Union. The movement towards a democratic state desiring NATO membership brought Ukraine closer to Europe while creating tensions with Russia.[78] This tension increased with unresolved territorial claims to Sevastopol as well as the Crimea, control of energy resources, and the post orange revolution protests resulting in a pro-west policy.[79] Although Ukraine aspired for NATO membership up until 2010, the change in NATO membership desires and agreement for Russian Naval basing in Sevastopol until 2042 assisted in preventing external conflict with neighboring Russia.[80] Similar to the dynamic in the Republic of Georgia, the people of Sevastopol see themselves as Russians versus citizens of Ukraine.[81] The basing agreement also significantly assisted Ukraine economically while it asserted Russian political influence in the region. Overall, national policy reduced the possibility for conflict over military modernization. US foreign policy achievements produced a relatively transparent program synchronized between the major contributors of SSR in the Ukraine and helped promote the US policy to increase capacity for Ukraine peacekeeping operations. The programs result in consistent capable Ukrainian contributions to PKO efforts and relatively effective internal stability. This helps to reduce overall tensions between Europe, NATO, and Russia. Additionally, there were no

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[77] U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009 vol. I," Joint Report to Congress (Washington, DC, 2009), 412-417.

[78] IHS Jane's: Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russia and the CIS: Executive Summary, Ukraine*.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Philippe Conde, Vasco Martins, *Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol Beyond 2017,* May 23, 2010, http://www.diploweb.com/Russia-s-Black-Sea-fleet-in.html (accessed March 20, 2011).

documented cases of contractor misconduct during this period. This case study provides an

example of overall successful US policy with regards to SSR efforts.

Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Georgia

The Republic of Georgia provides an example of a post-Soviet country in transition democracy

via an authoritarian state. Pushed by desires for close European and Western ties, Georgia intends

to create a market economy compatible with European norms within the construct of a democratic

government.[82] In 2007, 16 years after their independence, Georgia still had not resolved the

conflict of South Ossetia and Abkazia's desire for independence. Additionally, the potential of

opening access to Caspian Sea energy resources that bypass Russian control of access helped

open a political and economic dialogue between Europe, the West, and Georgia.[83] These

dynamics governments in transition with internal and external tensions at the political level led to

conditions for international political intervention.

Similar to the effort in Ukraine, the United States and NATO began to influence post-Soviet

states in order to increase security in Europe. Of greater impact, the US Government employed

several programs starting with the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) in mid- 2002. This

program was followed by the Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP) that support

BDE and bellow training through the conflict in August of 2008,[84] which led to various CTFP,

FMF, and IMET programs that supported military training efforts to help, "reduce the chance of

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[82] Per Gahrton, *Georgia: Pawn in the New Great Game,* (New York: St. Martin's Press LLC, 2010), 2.

[83] Ibid.

[84] IHS Jane's: Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russia and the CIS: Armed Forces, Georgia.* December 17, 2009. http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/CISS_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Georgia&Prod_Name=CISS &K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/cissu/geors100.htm@current (accessed March 2011, 19).

the spread of military conflict, international crime, and weapons of mass destruction."[85] Overall, these supported efforts toward NATO membership and Georgia's increased capacity to support regional and global security efforts.[86]

Russia, NATO, and Europe serve as the main elements influencing Georgia. The general policy of NATO and Europe in 2008 did not support the initiative to resolve Georgia's membership in NATO as indicated by NATO's refusal to offer Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP) in April of 2008.[87] This ceded to Russia the initiative to determine the regional policy on economic and security considerations in the Caucuses.[88] It did not prevent Georgia from participating in regional stability programs sponsored by NATO nor to seek defense modernization through various means. As a result, Georgia found itself lacking materiel support in August 2008 when the war in South Ossetia began.

In 2008, the US Government spent $4,562,231 in support of various activities with the bulk of the funds supporting CTFP, FMF, FMS, and IMET-1 programs.[89] These funds included the training of a brigade of infantry under SSOP II program by both military and contracted personnel. The military contribution focused on a broad spectrum of individual through collective training at the platoon level as well as Special Forces focused training. The contractor portion supported by Cubic's Defense Modernization Division trained battalions and brigades on the US Army's Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

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[85] U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 vol. I," Joint Report to Congress, Washington, DC, 2008.

[86] Ibid.

[87] IHS Jane's: Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russia and the CIS: Executive Summary, Georgia.*

[88] Stephen Blank, "From Neglect to Duress: The West and the Georgian Crisis Before the 2008 War," In *The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia*, ed. Svante E. Cornell, & Frederick Starr, 104-121 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2009), 109.

[89] U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009 vol. I," 138.

In August of 2008, the increased tension between Georgia and the South Ossetian militias resulted in increased occupation of South Ossetia by Georgian forces. Russia, in an attempt to assert its self, sent combat troops to the region in an effort to stabilize the region and protect the citizens of Russia.[90] The war only lasted five days, resulting in a South Ossetia void of ethnic Georgians and secured by Russians. Although the Georgians fought against a Russia with a considerably larger force, the effective employment of combat power at the unit level stemmed from both technology as well as doctrinal knowledge gained by individuals within SSR programs. The Army as a whole failed to demonstrate effective command and control or common doctrine to support military operations.[91]

In analyzing US foreign policy and its achievement, the US policy of increasing counter terrorism capacity and transitioning towards NATO admission served as an active means to supporting Georgian and regional stability. The US program, synchronized by DOS, lacked unity of effort with the US contribution as well as with other contributing nations. This resulted in a disjointed understanding at the tactical and operational levels by the Georgians. Additionally, the lack of transparency for contracted portions of the programs provided tension with the principle, unity of effort. Effective oversight for contracted trainers decreased the potential for contractor misconduct. Ultimately, the national authority chose conflict in contradiction to US foreign policy using many of the methods and tactics taught by US military trainers. Although Georgian national authority chose conflict, the Georgian security forces retained the ability to conduct small unit counter terrorism operations, but failed to adopt NATO doctrine within the forces.

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[90] Ronald D. Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 9.

[91] IHS Jane's: Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russia and the CIS: Armed Forces, Georgia.*

Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Croatia

Croatia provides an example of a military and government transitioning from Yugoslovian control to autonomy resulting in conflict. Croatia moved toward independence from Federal Republic of Yugolavia (FRY) in 1991 desiring to become autonomous.[92] This led to a brutal fight for independence between 1991 and 1995 that paralleled with the defense sector transition.[93] The UN arms embargo of 1991 limited both import of arms and military training and thus the Croatian government turned to contracted assistance for SSR.[94] The UN intervention prevented conventional SSR means by the US government leading to an indirect means of implementing foreign policy.

The US policy concerning Croatian SSR was shaped partially by international policy towards FRY. The United States, in conjunction with the UN, enacted national emergency control measures which supported many aspects of the UN embargo on the FRY. Thus, US policy focused initially on economic pressure to prevent FRY's ability to support continued civil strife in the region.[95] The US policy expanded in 1994 and included maintaining the territorial boarders of the existing states. This forced Bosnian Serbs to accept the Charter of the UN, and to accept the proposed territorial settlement, which prevents exportation of services to Bosnian Serbs.[96] The

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[92] IHS Jane's: Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans: Executive Summary, Croatia,* October 28, 2009, http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/BALK_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Croatia&Prod_Name=BALK&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/balksu/croas010.htm@current (accessed March 19, 2011).

[93] Timothy Edmonds, *Defence Reform in Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2003), 9.

[94] Deborah D. Avant, *The Market for Force; The Consequences of Privatizing Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 101.

[95] U.S. President, *Message to the Congress on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),* May 25, 1994, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=50238&st=croatia&st1= (accessed March 20, 2011).

[96] U.S. President, *Letter to Congressional Leaders on Additional Measures Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),* October 25, 1994, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49368&st=croatia&st1= (accessed March 20, 2011).

UN established embargo extended limitations on exports to any former Yugoslavian country, but the US congress in 1994 approved exportation of military training by Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) in order to support defense modernization for the Croatian Armed Forces.[97]

After establishing a basic military structure, the Croatians moved towards participation in NATO's partnership for Peace.[98] The requirement for external help to increase capability created the need for outside trainers that came in the form of MPRI. MPRI contracted two training activities, Democracy Transition Assistance Program (DTAP) and the Long Range Management Program (LRMP), which supported the modernization of Croatia defense forces. DTAP helped Croatia meet the necessary standards for entry into NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. The Trainers for DTAP consisted of a 15 man training team that focused on military and civilian law and how to interact with civilians.[99] This training consisted of "fourteen weeks with sessions eight hours a day, five days a week. Eleven courses were offered in physical training, education management, instructor training, topography, logistics, military service (international military law), leadership, military management (including analyses of historical battles and lessons), and first aid."[100]

The LRMP assisted in the development of a Croatian Ministry of Defense (MORH). The contract helped "establish the architecture, structure, organization and system for planning, programming

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[97] Deborah D. Avant, *The Market for Force; The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, 101-102.

[98] IHS Jane's: Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans: Executive Summary, Croatia*.

[99] Goulet, Yves, *Jane's Intelligence Review: International, MPRI: Washington's Freelance Advisors,* July 01, 1998, http://search.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir98/jir00528.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=MPRI&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JIR& (accessed March 27, 2011).

[100] Deborah D. Avant, *The Market for Force; The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, 102.

and budgeting functions for MORH."[101] Serbians contest the extent of the LRMP and DTAP

training and currently a class action lawsuit claims that MPRI trained and equipped and assisted

in the planning of Operation Storm.[102]

Operation Storm occurred in late 1995 for the sake of reclaiming the Krajina region from the

Serbians.[103] The Croatian Military attacked with 130,000 soldiers against the 40,000 Krajina Serb

Army creating a fore ratio of 3.3 Croates to 1 Krajina.[104] This force superiority exceeded the

concepts of US doctrine of force ratio in the offense. The equipment the Croats used did not

support maneuver warfare decreasing the Croats agility on the battlefield.[105] Additionally,

increased need for effective command and control combined with inculcated maneuver doctrine

supports the claim that MPRI effectively trained the Croatian military.

US foreign policy achieved passive support to long term Croatian stability. Although supported

by contracted trainers, the resulting increased capacity did not result in short term stability.

Ultimately, this case study demonstrates a lack of transparency as well as oversight. This is due in

part to the nature of the training conducted. Additionally, contractor misconduct by the trainers

demonstrates a lack of accountability.

Security Sector Reform in South Sudan

South Sudan serves as an example of a new state resulting from political tensions between a

sovereign state government and its population within a particular region. South Sudan did not

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[101] Goulet, Yves, *Jane's Intelligence Review: International, MPRI: Washington's Freelance Advisors,* July 01, 1998.

[102] Kahn, *U.S. Meracenaries Accused of Abetting Genocide,* August 18, 2010, http://www.courthousenews.com/2010/08/18/29683.htm (accessed December 27, 2010).

[103] Deborah D. Avant, *The Market for Force; The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, 103.

[104] Ozren Žunec, "Operations Flash and Storm," In *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991-1995*, ed. Branka Magaš, & Ivo Žanić, trans. by Ivo Žanić, 67-83, (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 78.

[105] Ibid., 79.

possess a sovereign government until the enactment of concessions based on a South Sudan

referendum authorized by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).[106] The 2005 CPA

also authorizes the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the representative party of the

disenfranchised South Sudanese, to transition a professional military body under the framework

of joint integrated units (JIUs) for the interim period prior to the establishment of a sovereign

state. The JIUs currently possess integrated units with both Sudan military forces and Sudan

People's Liberation Army (SPLA) forces operating under a common doctrine.[107] With successful

referendum for south Sudanese secession, the emphasis on SSR supports an autonomous state.

The SPLM security forces comprise of militias under the control of the SPLM. Currently the US

government works with the SPLA to assist in professionalizing the forces into JIUs in line with

the 2005 CPA.[108] The goal of this program includes establishing a professionally trained and lead

South Sudan National Army that is ethically balanced, aware of moral imperatives, and

contributes to national and South Sudan reconciliation.[109] These efforts largely use the existing

capacity within the US government to support Sudanese goals.

The international community policy in South Sudan largely stems from United Nations (UN)

Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1590 that establishes United Nations Mission in Sudan

(UNMIS). This resolution focuses and supports the transition of the SPLA in line with 2005 CPA

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[106] UN Mission to Sudan, "The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army." *UNMIS: United Nation Mission to Sudan.* n.d. http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf (accessed March 15, 2011), 8.

[107] Ibid., 88-89.

[108] U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 vol. I," 85.

[109] U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 vol. I," 85.

to a JIU framework.[110] This resolution also requires the UNMIS mission to liaise between all the

relevant actors who assist in the establishment of the JIUs. Additionally, it directs the UNMIS

mission to perform disbarment, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts in line with US

SSR doctrine. These efforts lead to an integrated approach between the relevant actors. As South

Sudan prepares for sovereignty in the summer of 2011, the UNMIS mission becomes critical in

synchronizing SSR efforts in South Sudan.

In 2009, the US government spent $939,669 for capacity building in South Sudan.[111] The support

from the United States largely relies on existing DOD and DOS programs utilizing government

agencies in support of SSR programs.[112] The DOS additionally uses contractors under the

AFRICAP program to both train SPLA drivers and mechanics as well as develop infrastructure

such as the SPLA DUAR division headquarters.[113]

The policy outcome of SSR programs within Sudan continue to promote stability within the

newly forming country of South Sudan. The successful conduct of the referendum in January of

2011 supports the potential for continued successful transformation to improved stability,

however, continued fighting between forces loyal to the SPLM opposition group SPLM-DC

create conditions for further conflict.[114] The inability of SPLA and police to suppress the

insurgency may lead to instability within the South Sudanese government in the future.

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[110] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1590 (2005),* March 24, 2005.
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/SC_Res1590_24Mar2005.pdf (accessed March 15,
2011).UNSCR 1590, pg 3-4.

[111] U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years
2009 and 2010 vol. I,"85.

[112] Ibid., 309-310.

[113] U.S. Department of State, *AFRICAP Recompete,* September 11, 2009,
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=8c9852ce91f1fe6c3e79273f0b04e500&tab=co
re&tabmode=list&= (accessed January 29, 2011); Arkel, *AFRICAP, SPLA Division HQ, Duar, Sudan,*
2011, http://www.arkel.com/index.php/international-projects/international-projects-
construction/international-projects-construction-project-3 (accessed March 16, 2011).

[114] Sudan Tribune, *Over 45 People Killed in Upper Nile's Clashes,* March 14, 2011,
http://www.sudantribune.com/Over-45-people-killed-in-Upper,38274 (accessed March 17, 2011).

US policy served as an active means for supporting the emerging government of South Sudan's stability. With active SSR training programs that utilized predominantly US contracted support for military training continued the transition towards a stable government. However, in this example, transparency of contracted training does not exist and potentialy leads to assumptions about the true nature and depth of the training. UNMIS in synchronizing efforts creates potential for continued positive unity of effort. Additionally, the GAO criticized the regional oversight of US SSR programs in the recent past creating conditions for possible misconduct.

Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Although the DOS African Bureau Strategic Plan and the DRC Mission Strategic Resource Plans are not publicly available, several other documents provide a general understanding of the approach to supporting DRC's SSR program. The DRC serves as an example of a state in transition towards democracy whose system is corrupt and requires international assistance with developing their capacity for both internal and external defense. DRC's government represents a weak state where state authority exists in a reasonably stable form, but demonstrates a lack of certain state functions capable of exercising duties within the rule of law.[115] Because of these problems, US DOS in conjunction with other international partners, continue to work on improving DRCs capability and legitimacy through an SSR process which includes trying, "to redefine FARDC's [Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo] appropriate missions, size, function, and organization."[116]

The requirement for increased security forces capacity comes from incursions by dissenting outside actors and other actors supporting the government. With regional actors supporting the instability within the country and the theft of the mineral wealth within the DRC, the necessity for

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[115] U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 vol. I," 45.

[116] Ibid.

building a capable military force to both defend the boarders and assist in enforcing territorial sovereignty is required.[117] Additionally, historical humanitarian atrocities, to include the rampages of the early 1990's where soldiers looted and killed those who stood in their way, create the requirement for fundamental changes within the existing military structure, to not only ensure the security force capacity exists, but to also ensure they execute their duties within the rule of law.[118] These actions and consistent abuse of power over time created a deep-seated distrust within the population re-enforcing the need for effective, transparent SSR programs executed not only from the United States but also from the other international partners.[119] From the perspective of the US Government, the priority for military assistance programs in the DRC includes supporting a modernized and professional military force capable of securing its boarders, protecting the civilian population, and assisting with regional and international peacekeeping operations.[120] In FY09 and FY10, DOS used PKO program funds to include the AFRICAP and Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance (ACOTA) to help advise the Congolese government. The following were the guidance; Force Modernization and Structure, Budget/Resource Management, Human Resources, Training and Operations, Logistics, Defense Procurement and Infrastructure, military Health, Military Justice and Equal Opportunity, and Communications as well as basic unit training modules.[121] The AFRICAP and ACOTA programs

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[117] René Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: From Failure to Potential Reconstruction," In *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, ed. by Robert I. Rotberg, 29-69. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 61.

[118] Ibid., 41.

[119] Ibid., 63.

[120] U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 vol. I,"45.

[121] U.S. Department of State, "Attachment F: TORP 3 (DRC) Advisors_revision 01," *Federal Business Opportunities,* August 4, 2008, https://www.fbo.gov/utils/view?id=b56693dcea30c6b12599f5a7a03484d3 (accessed March 6, 2011), 3.; The Henry L. Stimson Center, "U.S. Support to African Capacity for Peace Operations: the ACOTA Program," *Stimson,* February 2005, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ACOTA_BriefFinal_Feb05.pdf (accessed March 15, 2011), 1-2.

largely use retired soldiers as contractors to fulfill the advisory and training tasks. Although these programs support the mission theater campaign plan, AFRICOM's, the US GCC for Africa, programs may or may not support the DOS long term plans for DRC based on AFRICOM's lack of measuring long term effects.[122] Exasperating this situation, DOD and DOS have failed to monitor contracted projects leading to potential unintended consequences.[123] This situation becomes increasingly convoluted when observing the international community policy in support of DRC SSR.

The international community policy on DRC largely stems from United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1925 while facilitating the peacekeeping mission in the East the DRC also emphasizes the objective of building security capacity within FARDC.[124] In addition to the UN mission, the European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the DRC (EUSEC RD Congo) focus on SSR stabilization programs in the region. The EUSEC RD Congo supports the DRC three phases established for SSR programs emphasizing assistance in logistics, civil-military relations, human resource management, military professional training, and human rights.[125] Although the EU efforts appear complementary to United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) programs, the US effort in supporting SSR appears redundant based on the human resource management and military professional training tasks within the AFRICAP and EUSEC RD Congo programs.

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[122] United States Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa,* Report to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives (Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2010), 17.

[123] Ibid., 3.

[124] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1925 (2010),* May 28, 2010, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010) (accessed March 15, 2011), 3.

[125] European Union, "Decisions: Council Decision 2010/565/CFSP," *Official Journal of the European Union* 53, no. L 248 (September 2010): 59-60.

Overall, a lack of unity of effort persists within the international community's contribution to SSR.[126]

In 2009, the US government spent $1,400,159 for capacity building in DRC.[127] The programs implemented contained a mix of contracted and US government employee supported training programs. This included both IMET and FMS funds supporting US Foreign policy objectives.[128] These funds maximize the potential of government resources relying on existing government organizations such as Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) and contracted programs under the AFRICAP contract supporting Civil-Military Relations. This approach exploits both US government capability and contractor initiative.

The policy outcome of SSR programs within the DRC are difficult to ascertain. With the continued conflict within Eastern DRC and the continued involvement of MONUSCO in peacekeeping efforts, the capacity of FARDC and DRC police to provide for the general security of the population is limited and in some cases degrading. The lack of a legal framework approved by the DRC increases the inability for SSR to progress within the FARDC. Within the context of US SSR contribution, a distinct lack of transparency exists because of the proprietary nature for SSR contracting. Additionally, the DOS African Bureau has not maintained sufficient accountability of contractors in the recent past increasing the potential for misconduct or misapplication of resources. This creates the potential for adverse long-term results exasperated by the continued human rights violations perpetrated by elements of the FARDC.[129]

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[126]Madeline England, "Security Sector Reform in Stabilization Environments: A Note on Current Practice," 29.

[127] U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 vol. I," 45.

[128] Ibid., 256-263.

[129] United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,* Report of the Secretary-General, (New York: United Nations, October, 2010), 2.

Security Sector Reform in Senegal

Since 1986, Senegal's contribution to peace keeping operations in Africa served as an example for other nations on the continent. The Senegal militaries small size, yet professional force supports peacekeeping efforts in Africa under the control of both UN as well as African Union initiatives.[130] The contribution of more than 25 percent of their security force to peacekeeping operations demonstrates a willing participation and dedication to these efforts.[131] With six named United Nations peacekeeping operations on the African continent and other areas of concern within the African Union, Senegal serves as a ready and capable force to integrate into these operations. Through supporting efforts, partner nations and organizations increase the capacity of existing forces to conduct peacekeeping and counterterrorism efforts at the request of African nations and organizations.

US foreign policy supports Senegal efforts to act as a regional partner in peacekeeping operations. To achieve this end, the US government helps the Senegalese Armed Forces (SAF) primarily through several programs to include the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the ACOTA program.[132] The ACOTA program focusing on developing professional officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), compatibility of FAS forces in support of PKO in the region, and reinforcing a civilian controlled military that respects democratic principles, human rights, and rule of law.[133] The ACOTA program supports a UN approved period of instruction that enhances ACOTA partner nation's

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[130] IHS Jane's: Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - West Africa: Armed Forces, Senegal,* July 30, 2010, http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/WAFR_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Senegal&Prod_Name=W AFR&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/wafrsu/senes100.htm@current (accessed March 16, 2011).

[131] U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 vol. I," 77.

[132] U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 vol. I," 77-78.

[133] U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 vol. I," 77.

ability to support peace support operations (PSO) in Africa.[134] French efforts for increasing FAS capacity support these efforts as well.

The French government under the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities (RECAMP) program supports FAS capacity through similar means to the ACOTA program. The program focuses on individual and large collective training as well as pre-position PKO equipment stocks located on the African continent.[135] The large collective training occurred over two years focusing on case studies and staff development. A full scale exercise with troops culminated this exercise validating the instruction.[136] This training largely supports the collective desire of creating capacity in Africa to conduct PKO operations with forces from the region.

The US government spent $4, 344,346 for security force capacity building during 2009.[137] This money largely supported a mix of programs to include ACOTA Peace Support Operations training conducted by contractors in support of DOS Efforts.[138] IMET funds, however, served as the foundation for US military training expenditures supporting the continued development of a corps of competent officers and NCOs.[139] The increased capacity generated by these efforts moved the SAF towards their assumption of one Brigade serving as one of the African Union's African Standby Forces (ASF).

Although Senegal demonstrated a general lack of ability to interdict Casamançais rebels in Guinea-Bissau in 1998-1999, the FAS's ability to assist in PKOs demonstrates an enduring

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[134] U.S. Department of State, *AFRICAP Recompete,* September 11, 2009, https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=8c9852ce91f1fe6c3e79273f0b04e500&tab=core&tabmode=list&= (accessed January 29, 2011), 20.

[135] France Foreign and Defense Ministries, *Reinforcement of African Peace-Keeping Capacities (RECAMP),*http://www.un.int/france/frame_anglais/france_and_un/france_and_peacekeeping/recamp_eng.htm (accessed March 16, 2011).

[136] Ibid.

[137] U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 vol. I," Joint Report to Congress, (Washington, DC, 2010), 77.

[138] Ibid.,299.

[139] Ibid., 77.

capacity to assist in regional stability. The lasting conflicts within the borders of Senegal include

the small number of Casamançais rebels operating in Senegal's southern region of Casamance.[140]

Nearly half of the armed forces support boarder and internal stability efforts in Southern

Casamance.[141] Overall the military force continues to operate in a responsible manner supporting

the constitutional government and do not demonstrate a propensity for intervening in political

affairs.

In parallel with French SSR efforts, US policy supports increased capacity of Senegal to conduct

peacekeeping operations in Africa. The contracted nature of the ACOTA program creates little

transparency generating conditions for potential unintended consequences. Additionally, the

historical problems with oversight of US contracted programs in Africa create the possible

conditions for contractor misconduct. Overall, effective unity of effort between US and French

efforts led to successful security forces development to support peacekeeping operations in

Africa.

US foreign policy and its achievements served as an active means to supporting regional stability.

Through increasing capacity, in cooperation with other international partners, US efforts for SSR

are effective. Although the PKO security capacity increases, the method of emphasizing a mix of

SSR means allows the potential for effective programs supporting US policy. Overall, the SSR

effort in Senegal provides an example of synchronized effort between US and international

partners towards a common policy within the region.

Table 1 summarizes the key aspects, type of support, unity of effort, cost, and policy outcome. In

examining overall US unity of effort, contracted cases of Senegal and Croatia produced example

programs with good unity of effort reinforcing the US objective, unity of effort. These two cases

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[140] IHS Jane's: Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - West Africa: Executive Summary, Senegal,* June 30, 2010.

[141] Ibid.

illustrate good international unity of effort examples. However, the Croatia example does not due to the nature of the UN sanctions. The overall cost of SSR within the year analyzed varies, but as observed in the Georgia case study, cost does not clearly connect to strong policy results. In examining the US policy crossed with the relationship to conflict, the Georgia case study shows increasing tensions in the region between Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. Additionally, the Croatia case study resulted in war. These unintended consequences re-enforce the idea that SSR programs increase security capacity that a host nation uses as it sees fit. Lastly, the overall support for US policy varies. In the case of Ukraine, Georgia, South Sudan, and Senegal, the US policies were successful. In the cases of Croatia and DRC, the SSR program failed to support the US policy. Combining these failures with the unintended consequence of war associated with Georgia and Croatia, half of the case studies demonstrated failure by both predominantly contractor versus and mixed contractor cases.

Table 1

Case Study	Type of Support	US Unity of Effort	International Unity of Effort	US Cost (in YR. of Analysis)	US Policy	Relationship to Conflict	Support for US Policy
Ukraine	Mixed	Good	Good	$3,838,364 (2009)	Peacekeeping Ops.	No Conflict	Successful
Georgia	Mixed	Poor	Poor	$4,562,231 (2008)	Counter Terrorism/PfP	War	Successful
Croatia	Contracted	Excellent	N/A	UNK (1995)	Nat'l Defense/Human Rights	War	Failed
DRC	Mixed	Poor	Poor	$1,400,159 (2009)	Defense/ PKO / Human Rights	On Going Conflict	Failed
South Sudan	Contracted	Good	Good	$939,669 (2009)	Natl Defense	Post Conflict	Successful
Senegal	Mixed	Good	Good	$4,344,346 (2009)	Peacekeeping Ops.	Post Conflict	Successful

Conclusion and Observations

This monograph examined the efficacy of SSR programs conducted by government agencies as well as contractors, in relation to policy outcomes. First, an analysis of the foreign policy foundations and the written doctrine helped determine effectiveness. Lack of analysis identified within the literature for foreign policy employment lead to a closer examination of six case studies. These case studies identified the types of support, unity of effort, cost, policy and overall outcome. Examining the case studies with the three variables identified within the literature

review resulted in a unclear connection between a specific policy and the overall outcome. The following recommendations support the current doctrinal method for employing SSR.

Interpretations of Findings

US policy and doctrine largely supports the overall concepts of SSR and help achieve NSS goals. In concept, the increased capacity within the host nation facilitates greater security within the rule of law and increased regional stability. This stability supports US interests for overall security. Taking into consideration all of the relevant actors in each case, the outcome of SSR programs in practice is unclear.

The six case studies illustrate no correlation to SSR efforts consistent with examining the desired ends, and means used to achieve the goals for SSR. Using contractors or US government agencies led to the same helpful conclusions. SSR policy objectives do not consistently result in successful US policy outcomes. In the case of Georgia, Ukraine, and Senegal, US policy objectives led to overall successful policy outcomes for the period examined. Additionally, the US policy objectives in South Sudan resulted in successful policy outcomes based on the parallel nature of the militaries of North and South Sudan in the interim period defined by the 2005 CPA. On the other hand, the policy objectives in Croatia and DRC did not prevent human rights violations and inappropriate employment of forces. This brings into question the effectiveness of SSR programs. Additionally, how governments choose to employ their US trained forces further convolutes the analysis.

Regardless of the intent for the particular US policy issue with SSR programs, the type of support and the overall unity of effort of SSR programs may result in unintended consequences. Ultimately, the host nation government participating in the SSR program must utilize the increased security forces capacity correctly and in a manner that is appropriate. As indicated in the Croatia and Georgia case studies, the governments chose to use the increased capacity of security forces to attempt to regain lost lands. In the case of Ukraine and Senegal, they chose to

contribute to peacekeeping operations in support of US foreign policy. South Sudan efforts resulted in peaceful transition of governments with the potential for continued unrest or stability. Lastly, the example of the DRC shows that despite US efforts, DRC failed to resolve the ongoing conflict with no clear potential for resolution.

Recommendations

As DOD and DOS look at developing approaches to increase security force capacity in support of a specific policy, these agencies must identify methods that synchronize actual efforts. Establishing contracted SSR that tasks a separate contracted company to oversee its own contracts leads to a disconnect between US mission effort and the actual training or advice provided. A well-synchronized plan starts with, and resides in, the US mission to a country and requires integration of both other government agencies and non-governmental organizations. DOD facilitates this by approaching SSR from a supporting role and nests the theater campaign plan with the mission campaign plan.

Secondly, DOD and DOS SSR plans must identify strategic risk. Mitigation of this risk through advisors and programs that support mission efforts facilitates effective policy outcomes. By identifying the potential for misuse of security capacity, mission efforts focus on creating a foundation of appropriate use of the military prior to employment of specific training. In cases where the risk outweighs the potential stability outcomes, an appropriate program of interim capabilities would support basic security function while limiting the potential effectiveness in actual combat operations. The South Sudan case study provides a good example of how increased capacity facilitates peacekeeping operations in support of US policy goals, but does not effectively support conventional offensive operations.

Third, the US government must identify the most effective method that is integrated for SSR programs. Regardless of source, the means used to achieve SSR goals must support the most effective means given equal efficacy. This may come from contractors or from US government

agencies. Regardless of the method, the least expensive means must include transparency to facilitate the basic principles of SSR programs.

Recommendations for Further Study

The analysis of efficacy, using specific Task Orders compared against similar government tasks, facilitates a better understanding and informs DOS on the value of continued use for contracted SSR. A specific comparison of task orders within the DOS AFRICAP contract in relation to short and long-term effectiveness of equivalent DOD agencies facilitates this understanding. Further analysis and cost comparison between contracted and US government agencies would further facilitate an understanding of these types of programs. This allows DOS to make informed decisions on the continued use of these means within future SSR programs.

Conclusion

US foreign policy and SSR programs in current and historic application do not consistently develop SSR programs that result in successful US foreign policy. This disparity results, in part, due to the nature of SSR and the ways US DOS employs them. Additionally, the lack of unity of effort between the US DOS, DOD, and other international players creates potential conditions that do not support US policy goals. Ultimately, how a government uses its military bears heavily on its system of government. In any situation where US foreign policy calls for increasing military capacity of a partner nation, the policy assumes risk that is mitigated through effective, long-term programs for both military and government officials. This builds an understanding of lawful military employment.

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